Good afternoon, everyone.
And let me echo Leah's welcome.
Thank you so much for being here with us today.
For those of you who don't know me, I'm Omar Abbosh,
Accenture's chief executive for our comms, media, and technology clients.
And we're here today to talk about this topic of trust.
Now, trust sometimes may feel like a bit of a nebulous topic.
And just talking with my colleagues here on the panel earlier,
I was reminded of the late 1990s where people didn't trust to put their credit
card details on the internet.
But at some point, that changed, and this giant market
called e-commerce exploded and became what we see today.
In reality, though, the real application of the internet
and all its associated technologies and business are in the early stage.
So e-commerce is still a relatively small part of global retail,
and the internet has hardly penetrated into health care, insurance,
industrial, and many other sectors.
And the research that Accenture's published in the last couple of days
on the state of trust in the digital economy
basically is saying, look, if you go back 10 years, only 25% of companies
would have used the internet genuinely in their business operations.
Today 100% of companies use the internet in their business operations,
and they're increasing them.
The challenge for CEOs, though--
and I joke a little bit, caught between a rock and a hard place--
is, on the one hand, if a CEO and the company doesn't innovate fast enough,
they risk getting left behind.
But on the other hand, if they innovate too quickly,
they risk the erosion of trust because they're putting technologies
and innovations in traffic that they cannot secure.
And in fact, the evidence from the research
says that that is indeed the problem, that we're
erring on the side of going a bit too fast today, where
people are putting trust at risk.
And we think that the future value for business and society
is too high to play that risk.
So what we'd like to do today is talk to you about the state of trust today,
what organizations--
governmental and business-- can do about it, and then some concrete actions.
And I couldn't think of a better panel than this excellent collection
I have here with me today, representing business, government,
and law enforcement.
So Jean-Pascal Tricoire is the CEO of Schneider Electric.
And Agnés Pannier-Runacher is the Secretary of State for the Minister
of Finance and Economy from France, if you couldn't get that from my attempt
at French there.
And Jürgen Stock is a Secretary General of Interpol,
the organizing body of all the police federations around the world.
And so we're going to just dive into the topic.
We'll have a conversation amongst ourselves
and then invite the audience to join us at an appropriate moment.
So Jean-Pascal, Schneider Electric is engaged
in creating incredible technology for businesses, companies
to sensorize commercial operations, industrial plants.
You're putting more and more software into those facilities
and those capabilities.
Your EcoStruxure fabric is world-leading in terms of what you're doing.
How do you think about the state of trust today
and what Schneider is doing about it?
While preparing for this panel, I was thinking
that it's a very complicated matter.
At the end of the day, trust-- while at the beginning of the day,
trust is the base of everything we do in business,
the way people speak about processes, about controls.
But every day we trust our customers.
We trust our suppliers.
We trust our people because the base of the company is too delicate.
Some people think that a company's a series of signature on stuff.
But at the end of the day, it's all based on trust between people.
What we do at Schneider is to supply energy and automation digital solutions
for better efficiency on sustainability.
So therefore, it's pretty much the foundation
of many of our customers' solution.
We speak about digital.
But thinking about the subject, there was not
much trust in non-digital systems.
Systems-- we are breaking.
You didn't know it.
You couldn't prevent it.
30% still today of the public service outages in the world
are due to power outages that were not prevented because things, by the way,
were not connected.
If you've got one hour of interruption in the production line,
automotive, wherever, it's in million, six million, seven million, 10 million.
Normally, when I get a call from a CEO, it's coming from that.
In most cases, we are not responsible.
They call us for help.
So you can say that the old system is really physical, non-connected--
is trustworthy.
Therefore, in our sector, already four cities we've been connected.
We've been connected because it brings traceability.
It enables us to do predictive maintenance.
You start to see the things drifting before they happen,
and you can prevent problems to happen.
The new thing somewhere is a fact that the connected is getting connected.
So the IP connectivity of the world, the usage of the internet--
which brings three problems, as I see today.
The first point is that your data is accused
to be on-premise with a naive belief that it is impregnable
because it's on-premise.
It's getting duplicated somewhere.
So sometimes it's just a set of data, logs of data, SCADA,
that kind of thing.
They can be a full digital twin of your installation.
So there, there is a question of privacy.
What we experience as individuals when somebody holds our stuff
is true for your factory.
It can be true for your home.
It can be true for your building.
So that is the first problem.
So the second problem is a problem of entry point, connectivity.
What used to be on-premise, on so-called isolated,
is, in fact, now getting connected to the internet,
and we are all shit scared that somebody will enter this way.
And the third problem probably is a new topic
of AI, where now machines are learning about you,
and you don't know what they learn on the base of digital.
And there is a problem of ethics of the machines.
So that's the third point which I see as a subject which
is creating a problem of trust.
But at the end--
and I won't answer your question.
But do we have the choice?
Because OK, you have risk, but look at the advantages.
Average 25% energy efficiency, 30% on your OPEC, 30% on your Capex design.
Preventive maintenance-- you see the problems before they
happen, and you can prevent them.
So the elevator is not stopping.
The room is not in the dark.
Your production is not in the dark.
Trustability of the people who have interacted because,
before, when problems happened, you don't know what prompted it.
In this case, you will get you will get a trustability of the things.
So it's weighing risk and benefits, but everybody's rushing into it.
And I would finish by saying, on the top of it,
I believe that the new IP connectivity is safer than the insulation
because most of the problem we saw in the past
were not coming through the internet.
The were coming to a USB key, an infected PC,
a guy who'd come in who had played with his kids
over the weekend, got his PC infected that created a Trojan Horse
and or other thing.
And you didn't see anything.
So security in the cities--
I don't know what Jürgen will tell us.
Either you make barriers across your city,
or you put people who monitor what's going wrong in the city.
Or I see what we see today is that it's more about monitoring what's
going malicious, what's going wrong, than believing, quite naively,
that a wall is existing around your company.
So that's how I see it.
So what is the state of trust?
People are embarking because the benefits are huge.
And we are all working to elevate the monitoring of the installations
as we go forward.
You're reminding me, as you speak, Jean-Pascal-- actually,
I'm looking at Leah here-- of the energy sector, where there's
lots of doubts about connection.
But actually, security of supplying electricity and gas
is enforced by more interconnection, not less interconnection,
so there are some interesting parallels there.
But OK, so Schneider is on a mission of, we're going to exploit this technology
and use it for the benefit of society and business.
But our eyes are wide open to some of the issues
that we now need to mitigate and address.
So Agnés, President Macron had a very bold and courageous call around
the Paris Accord for cybersecurity.
Could you tell us a little bit about what you and the government
were thinking about that and what you want to achieve
with regards to trust, please?
Well, so as Jean-Pascal mentioned, there are
some risks attached to this cyberspace.
The risks are not only on the business, but it's also
on the conversations we are all having around the world
and sometimes on the, where is truth?
And what is not true?
And it's also an issue for democracy, and it's clearly
an issue for all democracies.
And the fact is, as of today, when you speak
of the physical space, more or less, we all
know how to use this physical space.
We know that we can get abused.
We know that we can get robbed.
But in fact, we're not going in a dodgy neighborhood at 2 o'clock
in the evening because we know where are the risks.
When it comes to cyberspace, I think we are maybe
not knowledgeable enough, maybe naive--
you mentioned the point.
And maybe the fact that we are all interconnected will
help because we will be more knowledgeable about the cyberspace.
But taking that into account, we have to act.
And we cannot act as governments alone because cyberspace don't know any
borders, don't know any specific rules.
And we have to acknowledge that this is a space where
we have to have a more collaborative approach
to set some collaborative rules and that we have all--
the companies, the governments, and even civil society--
a responsibility.
So this is what is at stake with the Paris call of the 12th of November.
It is to say we should have the same rights offline than online.
This is basic, but this is not the case as of today.
And we should work all together in a collaborative way.
And everybody is responsible for what is at stake at the cyberspace.
It's not only a question of commitment.
It's not only a question of companies who may have more technology
or whatever.
That would be clearly a deadlock.
And it's also a question of citizenship.
And through this Paris call, we want to make an awareness of a culture.
[INAUDIBLE] told me years ago, if you want to address an issue,
you have to make it visible.
So we make the issue visible.
And we say there is a way to address it.
We put it on the table, on G7, on G20, on the World Economic Forum.
We don't want to have a specific forum to address it.
We just want to say we need to cooperate.
We need to say we have a responsibility in it.
And we want to embark everybody to work on that
and to find some solutions that will be moving solutions, we are aware.
But clearly, this is a way to set the discussion and to set the move.
Perfect.
Thank you, Agnés.
And again, you've set my brain wondering about digital identity.
One of the issues with--
so elevating common understanding of cyber issues, I think,
is great and super important.
But one of the big differences between online and offline is anonymity.
In online, if you speak up in a way that your social environment doesn't like,
they tell you.
They signal it.
Offline, that doesn't happen.
And so there are some things for us to think about, how we may tackle those.
So you represent the federation of all the police agencies around the world--
Almost all of them.
190--
Four.
194 countries, so that's a lot of police groups.
And you help provide the infrastructure to connect them to help
fight crime in the 21st century.
So tell us a little bit about your high-tech infrastructure
and what you're doing to help manage increasing trust.
Yeah, first of all, thank you very much for having a global law
enforcement on that panel.
Of course, we consider that our role in fighting cybercrime.
But the same applies for terrorism, organized crime,
because very often these phenomena are linked with each other
in supporting prosecutions, investigations,
so to ensure that there is no safe haven for any kind of criminal activity--
but also for the prevention piece.
And I think trust is a very interesting concept and, of course,
very important for policing.
But I represent a very diverse community of 194 member countries' police
services, some of them conducting, on a regular basis, public surveys on trust.
And we know that, for instance, here in Switzerland, in France,
in my home country Germany, currently the police
this is ranking very high in public trust.
So in some countries, it's the number one.
So even higher considered as constitutional courts, politicians,
and other societal groups.
So trust is definitely a very important category for law enforcement.
But equally important is to having a clear set of rules and regulations
because I think trust is also based on transparency with
regards to what police is doing, actually.
So providing transparency, for instance, in handling
sensitive data, sensitive information.
And I was wondering-- you know that cyber crime is one of these extremely
under-reported crimes.
So currently, we do not have really a clear understanding
what the global landscape looks like with regard to cybercrime.
I could tell you a lot about international terrorism
and organized crime groups operating globally on environmental crime, drug
trafficking.
In terms of cyber, of course, we all recall these wake-up calls
like WannaCry, NotPetya.
My home country Germany had an incident a couple of days
ago, almost, where there was a big disruption, which--
the investigation is still going on.
But it seems that it was somebody who, years ago, would have called a "script
kiddie," still living in his mother's and father's basement
and causing a data breach concerning more than 1,000 politicians,
journalists, and everybody.
So not a high profile criminal, perhaps--
perhaps-- but causing a major disruption.
So we know these cases, and the consequences have been the same.
So the Germans understood cyber hygiene is still an issue.
So what does it mean in terms of the category of trust?
Are people-- if they use the password, 123456, or, I love you, do they
trust nothing will happen?
Or is it ignorance?
What is that?
I don't know exactly.
And why is it that only maybe 2%, 3%, 4% of all the incidents
that are taking place are reported to the police?
Because we all want to make sure that the internet is not
becoming a kind of no-go area that nobody trusts.
The internet has a platform for communication
and has a platform for business.
So I think law enforcement, in ensuring that cyber criminals are
brought behind bars, is one important component, beside prevention.
So why is it that every bank, for instance,
has a red button that, in case that there's a bank robbery--
it's almost dying out.
Nobody is conducting bank robbery anymore
because the cyber is much easier.
But why is it that every bank has such a red button which they push immediately
in case an incident occurs?
And in the cyber arena, obviously, first of all, it takes still,
statistically, 150 days to become aware that they have been breached.
And secondly, if they become aware, they do something but not
informing the police.
So why is it?
Is it a category of trust because they do not exactly
know what the police is doing in such an incident?
They don't know whether the prosecutor is shutting down the company
or pulling the blacks and seizing all the computers
and the businesses is collapsing for some time.
Is it because they do not trust in our abilities
to investigate that kind of crime on a global level?
And of course, that maybe should conclude my introductory remarks
by saying global law enforcement, in its diversity, has, in the recent years,
been successful in conducting cyber investigations.
We all know the example of some of the major Darknet marketplaces, AlphaBay,
Hansa market, which were taken down.
We know some of the botnet incidents, so denial of service attacks
where botnets have been taken down by, at least,
those law enforcement agencies that have the capability
and the trained staff at that stage, and those
who have been establishing a go ahead and close cooperation
with the private sector.
That is key.
That also has something to do with trust.
I think Davos is a great trust building exercise for all of us,
the convening power of the World Economic Forum.
But again, I would say having clear rules and regulations is equally
important, that trust comes from the existence of clear rules
and regulations, from transparency, that everybody understands
what is global law enforcement doing with the information I provide,
what happens if I enter into a collaboration with Interpol,
for instance, on developing cyber security-related solutions,
developing tools.
What exactly is law enforcement doing?
And I think we have to be much better in explaining that to the public.
And we have to be much better in setting up
new, institutionalized forms of partnership,
what I'm doing here every day now, every hour, and today here,
inviting representatives of companies, like Accenture, for instance,
in joining our desk-by-desk approach, where international law enforcement
teams, joint investigation teams, are sitting together with private sector
people under a strict set of rules and regulations
and trying to create preventive powers and trying to successfully investigate
cyber crime.
So a very interesting concept, the concept of trust.
But equally important is that we all understand what's going on,
have clear rules and regulations in place,
which is difficult on a global scale because, of course,
we are talking about a global phenomena, which
requires a global, comprehensive, well-coordinated approach.
Yeah.
I'm just going to reflect a little bit on the last comments you made here
again and then come around to talk about, well, what should we be doing.
But so when you asked the question about, why do
businesses not immediately declare what's going on in the case of a breach
that they half know about--
so I'll tell you what I hear from my clients.
In some cases, the law enforcement's agencies
do indeed show up with muddy boots, stamping around the house
and making a mess without thinking about, what
does it really mean for the business.
In other cases, the standards that we have established in other domains,
like benzene gets into my mineral water or my brakes are not functioning
so well, and I do a mass product recall--
those standards where people know how to handle those crises--
that hasn't established itself yet in the cyber sphere.
And so those are some of the reasons, I feel like,
why there may be some hesitancy.
So as I listen to the three of you--
more transparency, more collaboration, more education
so that people understand clearly can be enormously helpful,
and we all need to play our role in helping make more of that happen.
If I come around a little bit, Jean-Pascal.
And you talked upstairs about the fact that computing is leaving
the naively protected data center.
And it's not just gone to the cloud, but in fact, it'll go to the edge.
And in a world of tens of billions, depending on whose numbers you look at,
hundreds of billions of connected devices, intelligence and data
will be stored in a vastly broader array than what we see today.
So how does Schneider thinking about securing that kind of environment?
And how do you think about the trust issues
that you will confront going forward?
Well, we are obsessed by it.
Well, there are two points that we need to secure.
The first one is our systems and the customer.
We have to secure our customers' systems, which is the first priority.
And then there is second one, which is securing our own company.
And they are not exactly the same.
But by the way, coming back on what you are mentioning,
one of the reasons why companies take time to go back to police--
you need time to understand because sometimes you
don't know exactly where it comes from.
At least when there was a bank robber, it
was a bad guy with a gun in front of you.
Sometimes a cyber thing is coming two or three steps,
and you need to understand a little bit.
And we work sometimes with people like you to establish that,
but it takes it takes time.
Now back to my subject, what is, at least on our side, our principle.
The first thing is really make a mapping of the risk
because you can elevate defenses eye-level on this part of your system.
If you have no defense in that sense, in that actuator,
on that part of software, there is no point to have a wall eye-level.
So we do scenario afterwards.
You have to put in those jobs, people with a healthy level of paranoia,
which is--
so that they're always imagining the worst possible.
So that the first thing.
The second point is that clearly everything
which is around cyber protection on the budget, on allocation
has been ramping very, very fast.
One thing that I'm looking at is making sure--
the advantage of being a 25 billion euro company is that a lot of R&D
is to have enough mass, the R&D. Develop platforms--
there used to be a time where people say, I have to experiment fast.
Everybody's doing his own subsystem enough.
So the funny thing is that digital is a funny package
of testing very fast on the market, so doing first initiative.
But at the same time, big discipline on the backbone of your system
so that you can mutualize, [INAUDIBLE] that everybody
benefits from what you are doing.
In our sector, which is connecting products to control systems
on the edge, to analytics, duplicating on the cloud, end-to-end design--
it was easy to manage a company in our sector
15 years ago when everybody was doing a product, which
we are not talking to each other.
Today, much more complicated.
In terms of leadership, it's having this environment
where you cultivate, on one side, a full compliance sense of discipline.
And, at the same time, the spirit to try things fast is a complicated thing.
It's a balance of every moment.
What else could I say?
Alliances.
The old industries working on securing systems--
personally I say to my teams--
never develop something that somebody else
is doing in a much larger quantity.
There has been this crazy belief when digital was born that everybody
could develop his own technology.
Nothing has changed.
There is still an effect of scale.
The people who are very good at the secured cloud
are very good at the secured cloud.
People who are very good at that acquisition and algorithm
are very good at that.
Nothing has changed.
There is no walking on the water, flying to the sky.
It's exactly the same.
So we are working in a close manner we selected, strong partners with whom
that we trust to help us building IO defenses,
and we would do it in another way.
We work with people like Interpol.
Or there are countries where we operate that it's not our country of origin,
and we love that the agencies, the local agencies,
are really considering us as partners.
So not only watch your system but, those people watching, all the time,
the net that tell you, we've seen that there
may be something malicious happening.
We work together in resolving things.
So it's not only technology, but working with all ecosystem.
And finally, training people because, really, you
want everybody to be, on that side, very compliant,
that there is zero tolerance in doing funky things
and forgetting to be trained the latest things on cybersecurity.
That's how I would put it.
The last thing-- and you said it.
It seems a duty of a company is to be transparent.
Shit happens because of multiple attacks.
Good thing is that--
cross finger, touch monkey's skin--
so far, systems react well.
But at the same time, you call the customer and say,
there has been this problem.
We are working on it.
We work on it together.
But you have to be super transparent on what-- this is a base of trust.
The zero problem environment never exists.
It was not existing the physical world.
It's not existing in the digital world.
But you trust people who speak truth to you.
That was great, Jean-Pascal.
And actually, as Jean-Pascal's speaking, he
reminds me of my longtime boss who very recently stepped down
as the chairman and CEO of Accenture, Pierre Nanterme, who
had a phrase of, call a cat a cat.
So I think we just got a bit of that experience here.
So [FRENCH] happens.
It's good to know it's probably global phenomenon that we need to deal with.
Jean-Pascal, actually in the research, one of the things that came out
is that what all the 1,700 executives we spoke to said
is that one of the hardest things they're finding to secure nowadays
is third parties in their supply chain.
So 80% of companies are saying that's one of the hardest things
to grapple with is how to establish standards for security
in the supply chain that are not where many companies have grown up.
So just something to--
Some of the appointees work a lot on standards
together, on the interfaces to make sure you secure the point of junction
between your company.
At the same time, you learn a lot from the others.
People believe it's always easy to work by yourself.
Actually, when you work with other companies,
it forces to clean the interfaces, and normally it makes you more secure.
And actually, on that last point, I was very heartened in the research
that the vast majority of executives said that no company is big enough
to handle this issue alone.
So everyone recognizes the need to connect and collaborate,
as you said, with the threat intelligence
groups and all the various industry bodies around security.
[INAUDIBLE] Accenture has convinced you that you need them to secure yourself.
[LAUGHTER]
And by the way, Kelly Bissell, who runs Accenture Security,
is in the back of the room.
[INTERPOSING VOICES]
And if I may add it to that point, currently we
do not have a global early warning mechanism in place.
That's also a lesson that we all were able to learn after WannaCry,
after NotPetya, that information was available at that time.
Some companies were using this information.
But it was not shared because such a mechanism doesn't exist,
and it still doesn't exist.
So we have certs in place.
We have-- sometimes on a national level, there's a lot going on--
sometimes, but rarely, on a regional level.
But we really need to set up a global early warning
system against this threat.
And again, no country, no company, no country, no region
can do that in isolation.
So that also maybe requires, yes, trust and commitment
to build that collaboration.
And I think the Center for Cybersecurity that
was set up here under the auspices of the web is
another good opportunity for the private sector
and linked to global law enforcement through Interpol.
But it also requires the lawmakers to help
us setting up this regulatory framework and that framework
on setting out clear SOPs.
In case something happens, what is the way
to alarm the community very, very quickly?
Because we know from WannaCry, a lot of the damage
could have been prevented with a proper global mechanism that
urgently needs to be developed.
And regular patching would help as well.
But I completely agree.
Yes, simple as it is.
That's not enough.
[INTERPOSING VOICES]
--the sharing and transparency, as it was mentioned.
Just to give you an example, as I was a former deputy CEO,
we have some cyber approach to see where our weaknesses and what
we have to improve.
And in fact, we see that there was a weakness through a supplier.
So our company IT--
you can go through a supplier and go to another company.
So it was not a weakness affecting us, but it
was affecting one of the big listed company in France
and was very surprised.
Of course, we make the communication [INAUDIBLE]..
But that means that sharing the information, collaboration,
transparency are absolutely key.
And coming back to basic, another example when
we launched all the cybersecurity, GPDR, was on the market,
sharing information on the customers.
We tracked the fact that some people from the executive management
have some information on the net that was for sale.
So we just communicate on that, and the executive in my team
was not aware that their own data was for sale on the net.
And it changes completely what was supposed
to be a netstrike approach-- the customer, GPDR, constraints,
headache, whatever.
It becomes very personal because there were attacks in their own integrity.
And I think that, in education, there is very basic thing to do,
which is to educate your employees also to be able to tackle the cyberspace
security as citizen--
that is, to know what are the main ways to misuse the information--
to educate them as customers, and to educate them as professionals
because they will have a 360 degree approach.
And that can make them much better professional and much better citizens
and customers.
And I think this is what is also at stake, very basic approach.
That's perfect, Agnés.
Thank you.
And everything you're saying resonates with me a lot.
I think one of the realizations that society is coming to is
you don't have to be rich and famous to get hacked.
And in fact, the cost of hack is super cheap and automated.
And so the kind of education you're talking about
is required of every citizen who wants to look
after themselves and their families.
So Jürgen, what would you ask of business in terms of better
collaboration with law enforcement?
What are the sorts of things that you're really
after for the next level of evolution to help ensure more trust?
From organizing collaboration on meetings like that--
there is a nice potential partner--
let's do something together, which very often
is the basis for good work, good collaboration,
entering into a more institutionalized collaboration,
and also accepting perhaps some risks in terms of what is the perception, what
is maybe reputational risks around that, or what's the return on investment.
I think what is required in light of the dimension of the threat,
and the dimension of the threat will only
increase during the next couple of years as the world is
continuing being hyperconnected.
It's quite clear that this provides unprecedented opportunities
for criminals of all kind to attack our systems, so the threat will increase.
But to institutionalize on a national level, on a regional level,
on a global level, a well-organized and coordinated cooperation
amongst the business sectors.
So maybe, I don't know, the critical infrastructures, any kind of industry
amongst themselves, which very often already exists--
But sharing across the different businesses and building the bridge
between business and public sector or the many agencies that are nowadays
responsible for cybersecurity issue, specialized agencies--
in some countries, already plenty of--
sometimes on a local level, on a state level, on the federal level.
So there is a complex architecture of security.
And if we do not coordinate these activity properly,
we open the door for vulnerabilities.
So we need to develop that architecture of security.
And we have to enter into a new institutionalized way
of cooperating in a planned way, in a strategic way with the private sector.
So again, we try to do that on a small scale in our Interpol Global Complex
for Innovation in Singapore, where we have at least currently 15
companies that have been seconding staff into the center, based
on clear rules and regulation to which information they have access and not,
and working on security solutions and also supporting investigations.
And the next step might be developing joint incidence response
teams that helps in terms of a crisis to immediately helping finding
the answers their business continues.
But on the other hand, we can mitigate the impact of an attack.
So institutional cooperation with the private sector
on a national, regional, and global level.
That's, I think, what we further need to develop.
So you've put lots of thoughts, I think, in everyone's mind here.
I'd like to come to the audience and open up a bit
and get your perspectives.
Just before I do, Leah, will you give me the five minute warning?
Because it's not just me that's been exhausted by Davos.
My watch conked out a little bit earlier.
[LAUGHTER]
So that would help.
Just a word, also, on government approach.
I believe that the government has to lead an impulse to debate.
And I completely agree with you.
And this is clearly what is at stake in the Paris call.
We had to pull and analyze the knowledge and then to be able to frame the rules.
But if you want to frame the rules, we need to frame it based on the evidence,
and the evidence comes from the companies.
So there's clearly a need for collaboration.
And please, do not hesitate to embark in the Paris call
and to work with us because we would like
to make some proposals and agenda and proposals for the coming year
to know how we can move forward and settle the foundations of regulations
that is pragmatic but efficient.
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